The Impact of Local Welfare Offices on Children's Enrollment in Medicaid and SCHIP Nearly 20% of children entering Kansas' State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) and more than 25% of children entering the state's Medicaid program leave public health insurance altogether before completing a full year of coverage, when the first redetermination of eligibility should occur. Analyses of administrative data indicate that high rates of premature disenrollment are strongly associated with case management practices at local social services offices. However, local offices enroll the vast majority of children into public health insurance. To avoid a potential trade-off between local offices' impact on enrollment and retention, the study suggests that states such as Kansas consider improvements in automation to support caseworkers' difficult jobs.
Over the past two decades, states and the federal government gradually have extended public health insurance benefits to an ever wider group of low-income children. In 1997, Congress created the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), which offered federal matching funds at enhanced Medicaid rates for states to extend coverage to low-income children living in families with incomes exceeding the Medicaid eligibility threshold. Every state took advantage of the new funding, and Kansas implemented its SCHIP in January 1999. Following SCHIP's implementation, Kansas, like many other states, focused efforts on outreach and enrollment processes in order to maximize participation in the new program and to expand participation in the pre-existing Medicaid program. Soon thereafter, evidence began to emerge demonstrating that disenrollment also could have a significant impact on participation.
Kansas was one of the first states to document high rates of disenrollment of children from SCHIP (Allison, LaClair, and St. Peter 2001; Haber 2001) . Multi-state comparisons of SCHIP disenrollment patterns confirmed that these results were not isolated. Dick et al. (2002) found that SCHIP disenrollment rates during the first year of coverage were quite similar in Oregon, New York, Florida, and Kansas, and that differences in enrollment survival were related largely to differences in the nature or frequency of eligibility redeterminations. Several studies have addressed issues related to the re-enrollment process, but there is little evidence in the literature regarding causes of disenrollment occurring prior to, or apart from, re-enrollment (Pernice et al. 2002; Shenkman, Steingraber, and Bono 2002; Shenkman, Schaffer, and Vargas 2002) . Rates of disenrollment during these time periods can be significant. Under Kansas' re-enrollment policy, families with children in SCHIP and Medicaid reapply for coverage annually. In Kansas, nearly 20% of children who enter SCHIP and more than 25% of children who enter Medicaid leave public health insurance before completing a full year of coverage, when the first re-enrollment should occur. During the period of continuous coverage between redeterminations, caseworkers are instructed to ignore changes in income and family structure that otherwise might affect a child's eligibility and cause a transfer between SCHIP and Medicaid or a disenrollment from public health insurance. In light of this policy, high rates of exit during the first year of coverage are especially difficult to understand.
This study uses enrollment and applications data from the state of Kansas to assess the potential causes of disenrollment during the initial period of continuous coverage, which in Kansas extends for a full 12 months. Prior research suggests that many of these disenrollments may be involuntary and administrative in nature (Allison, La Clair, and St. Peter 2001; Allison 2002) . Anecdotal reports from Kansas' Medicaid agency suggest that administrative disenrollments from public health insurance during the 12-month period of continuous coverage may be due in part to complications associated with the practice of coordinating a family's (continuing) enrollment in various public assistance programs (e.g., Medicaid, SCHIP, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families [TANF], food stamps, and child care). To test this hypothesis, this study used applications data to construct a proxy variable for the nature and location of case management in an attempt to isolate the potential impact of case management on premature disenrollments. Quantitative results were vetted with state eligibility workers and administrative staff from around the state to provide insights and potential explanations for observed patterns. Findings indicate that the most likely explanation for premature disenrollment is an inadequate electronic eligibility system, coupled with certain case management 1 practices at local social services offices. However, the findings also indicate that local offices have enrolled the vast majority of children in public health insurance programs. The study identifies policy options for Kansas and other states that might increase rates of retention without undermining the important role that local offices play in the enrollment process.
Background
Since SCHIP's introduction in 1999, families in Kansas have been able to apply for public health insurance on behalf of their children either by mailing a joint SCHIP/Medicaid application to a central ''clearinghouse'' or by applying in person at a local office of the state's Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS). The clearinghouse is operated by a private firm under contract with SRS and exists solely to assess eligibility for, and manage enrollment in, SCHIP and Medicaid 2 (i.e., public health insurance). Families not submitting a mail-in application are presumed to have applied at a local SRS office. Unlike families that mail in a joint SCHIP/ Medicaid application, families applying at a local SRS office may present with the intention of enrolling in one or more of SRS's many assistance programs (e.g., cash assistance, food stamps, or child care).
Based purely on convenience, it would appear that families applying for public health insurance in person at a local office would be more likely than mail-in applicants to also be participating in other SRS assistance programs. While this could not be measured directly, available data indicate that most walk-in applicants (about 75%) during the study period had their cases managed at a local SRS office, and SRS offices were supposed to manage the health insurance cases only for children whose families also participated in other assistance programs. 3 Conversely, most mail-in applicants (about 75%) were managed at the clearinghouse, and the clearinghouse was supposed to manage only those children in families that were not also participating in other SRS programs. We take advantage of the strong relationships among the type of application, the location of case management, and the family's likely participation in multiple assistance programs to make inferences about the effect of case management on disenrollment.
Data and Methods
Data for this study include the official monthly enrollment records for all children with public health insurance in Kansas between July 1, 1998, and June 30, 2001 . The study measures enrollments according to the duration of the first observed enrollment beginning on or after January 1999, the first month of SCHIP's operation in Kansas. Of the 234,758 unique children represented in the enrollment data set, 141,490 were found to have become newly enrolled during the study period of January 1999 through June 2001: 22,190 children who initially enrolled in SCHIP, and 119,300 children who initially enrolled in Medicaid. While new enrollees were characterized according to the program that they first entered-that is, SCHIP or Medicaid-the duration of enrollment was measured across both programs, so that direct transfers from one program to the other did not count as disenrollments.
All data included in duration analyses were adjusted to account for the right-censoring of enrollments that continued through to the end of the time period observed. Censored enrollments were removed from the calculation of hazard and survival functions beginning in the month that censoring took place, so that their lack of observed enrollment in the program beyond that point did not count as disenrollments. Because the study is concerned solely with the enrollment experiences of children, enrollments that ended when children reached age 19 were treated as rightcensored. Medicaid enrollments that continued beyond a child's 19th birthday were truncated at that point and considered to be right-censored.
This study also analyzed records of all mail-in applications for public health insurance received by the central clearinghouse from its inception in 1998 through June 30, 2001. The applications data include approximately 56,061 records. After accounting for repeat applications and other applications not associated with a new enrollment, 29,880 children were identified as having newly enrolled in SCHIP or Medicaid through the mail-in application process.
The analysis assessed the potential causes of disenrollment by measuring the relationship between the probability that a child will exit public health insurance during his or her first year of coverage and the type of application submitted on his or her behalf (i.e., an in-person application at a local SRS office or a mail-in application to the central clearinghouse). The results were used to make inferences about the effect of case management on rates of premature disenrollments at local offices as compared to the clearinghouse. Nevertheless, differences in disenrollment rates between mail-in and walk-in applicants could be due to differences in the two populations rather than to differences in administrative practices at the two locations. Therefore, a multivariate logistic regression analysis of premature disenrollment was employed to control for differences in the two populations using demographic information from the administrative data. To help interpret the quantitative results, the author engaged in extended discussions with central office staff at SRS and eligibility staff at four of the 11 regional SRS offices around the state. The four regional offices were selected to be geographically and demographically representative of the state. Informal interviews at each of the selected local offices were conducted with the administrative director of eligibility and with caseworkers.
Results

Descriptive Analysis
Figure 1 presents the basic pattern of disenrollment that motivated this study. This is a standard empirical Kaplan-Meier enrollment survival curve for new Medicaid and SCHIP enrollees showing the percentage of children who remained continuously enrolled in public health insurance between one and 30 months after enrolling. 4 Steep drops in the enrollment survival curve in months 13 and 25 presumably reflect the large number of children who exited following their annual eligibility reviews. 5 This study focuses on the significant accumulation of exits that occurred during the first year of coverage (i.e., during months one through 12). Nearly 20% of SCHIP enrollees and more than 25% of Medicaid enrollees exited public health insurance during the first year of coverage. It is possible that some proportion of these exits could have been due to legitimate exceptions to Kansas' continuous coverage policy, such as a family moving out of the state, a family requesting to be dropped from coverage, or children eligible for Medicaid by virtue of their participation in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program or foster care. 6 Data analyzed in this study do not include markers for families that moved out of state or dropped coverage, but none of the state agency officials interviewed as part of this research believe that these were common events during the initial 12-month enrollment period. The multivariate analysis presented subsequently controls for eligibility categories that do not qualify for continuous coverage. Figure 2 provides an initial indication of the strength of association between the type of application and rates of disenrollment. Like Figure 1 , Figure 2 compares disenrollment rates for SCHIP and Medicaid enrollees, focusing now on the cumulative percentage of children who disenrolled from public health insurance during their first year. However, in Figure 2 , SCHIP and Medicaid children are further subdivided according to whether their families applied in person at an SRS office or whether they mailed in an application to the clearinghouse. The result is striking; within each application type, there is little difference in disenrollment rates between SCHIP and Medicaid enrollees. For both Medicaid and SCHIP enrollees, there is about a 20 percentage-point difference in the probability of premature disenrollment between walk-in and mail-in applicants.
Multivariate Analysis
A simple comparison, such as the one summarized in Figure 2 , leaves open the possibility that walk-in and mail-in applicants might differ in substantial ways, and that it is some other characteristic or set of characteristics-and not case management per se-which causes walk-in applicants to disenroll at such a high rate. For example, it is conceivable that children of a particular age, gender, or region of residence might for some reason be both more likely to enroll at a local office and more likely to disen-roll prematurely. To control for some of these other factors, a multivariate logistic analysis of premature disenrollment was conducted, using as controls all the available demographic information contained in the administrative files. Controls were included for: age at entry (four categories); gender; programmatic category of eligibility at entry (eight categories); date of enrollment (three six-month cohorts); urbanicity (five categories); and region of residence (11 regions). Table 1 summarizes the results of the logistic analysis, where the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the child left public health insurance during the first year of coverage (1) or remained continuously enrolled for that 12-month period (0). Due in part to the large population analyzed, many of the included independent variables were found to have a statistically significant impact on disenrollment. Older children, SCHIP non-premium payers (referent), and urban enrollees (referent) all were found to disenroll at statistically significantly higher rates. Children enrolled in SSI and TANF were found to be less likely to disenroll early after controlling for the type of application, possibly because these poorer and/or disabled children may remain eligible for health benefits and may stay in contact with the public assistance system more consistently and for a longer period of time. 7 Of particular interest, however, was the finding that the odds that a walk-in applicant will disenroll during the first year of coverage are about three times greater than the odds that a mail-in applicant will leave early. 8 Because odds ratios sometimes can be misleading or difficult to interpret in terms of what they reveal about the underlying probabilities, the results of the logistic analysis are presented again in Table 2 in terms of the effect that each characteristic has on the probability that a child will disenroll during the first year of continuous coverage (evaluated at population means of the explanatory variables). The more intuitive results in Table 2 indicate that a walk-in applicant is about 21 percentage points more likely to disenroll early than is a mail-in applicant. Note that the type of application has a much stronger effect on disenrollment than does the category of eligibility. Even comparing SCHIP non-premium payers to SSI enrollees yields only a 12 percentage-point difference in the probability of disenrolling early. 9
Apparently, the type of application is a powerful predictor of early disenrollment in both relative and absolute terms.
Discussion
The results summarized in Figure 2 and Tables 1 and 2 raise important questions about the potential causes of excess disenrollments among children whose families apply in person at a local SRS office. To answer these questions, it is helpful to understand how the context for case management relates to the type of application a family submits. As noted earlier, the way a family applies for health benefits is highly associated with where their enrollment case will be managed, or maintained, following initial enrollment. During the study period, most mail-in applicants had their cases managed at a central clearinghouse, while most walk-in applicants were managed at local SRS offices. Local offices and the clearinghouse provide two distinct settings for enrollment case management. Caseworkers located at the clearinghouse manage enrollments in public health insurance programs only. In stark contrast, caseworkers in local offices manage families that are involved in multiple assistance programs; in fact, coordination of various benefits is central to the mission of the local office.
To assist with the interpretation of the quantitative results presented previously, SRS central office officials, as well as managers and caseworkers in four regions across the state, were asked which aspects of case management at local offices might lead to premature disenrollment. In general, these eligibility workers were surprised to find out that 20% to 25% of children did not receive 12 months of continuous coverage, and that rates of disenrollment were about 20 percentage points higher at local offices than at the clearinghouse. In their efforts to explain these results, administrators and caseworkers focused on the implications of the local offices' role in coordinating various assistance programs, and on the computerized eligibility system used to administer several of those programs. The following interpretations of the study's findings are based upon explanations offered by these administrators and caseworkers.
Potential Problems Associated with the Coordination of Benefits
According to state administrators and eligibility caseworkers, continuous coverage is not always applied automatically by the state's computerized eligibility system, which is used for all the major assistance programs except child care. In some circumstances, caseworkers must actively apply the continuous coverage policy. For example, 12-month review dates are not generated automaticallybythecomputerizedeligibility system.Caseworkers actually have to calculate and enter the appropriate date for reviewing eligibility. Because applications sometimes take time to process, and because enrollments do not always become effective on the date of application or the date the application is processed, caseworkers report that it is possible to accidentally set the review date a month or two too early. Increased disenrollment rates in the 10th to 12th month of enrollment (see Figure 1 ) are consistent with this explanation. 10 In addition, caseworkers may choose to align a child's review date with an earlier TANF, food stamp, or child care assistance review in order to reduce their administrative burden and inconvenience for the family. 11 If they do that, the child is disenrolled automatically from public health insurance on the review date. Thus, health coverage is lost unless the caseworker goes into the eligibility system and manually re-enrolls the child, either for a new period of continuous coverage (if the child is found to be eligible), or for the remainder of the initial 12-month period (if the child does not successfully complete the re-certification process). The computerized system is not programmed to remind caseworkers that health insurance benefits can be restored in this manner. A premature disenrollment also may occur when a caseworker chooses to update information in the medical benefits portion of the computerized eligibility system prior to the end of the 12-month period of eligibility using information received in the process of administering other assistance programs. Some families with publicly insured children must provide caseworkers with monthly income data to maintain their family's concurrent eligibility for other pub-lic programs. Before implementation of the continuous coverage policy, this new information was used to update eligibility for health benefits as well. However, even after the 12-month coverage policy was instituted, some case workers may have continued to update all programmatic subsystems, including health insurance benefits, whenever new information about a family became available. Under this practice, the eligibility system automatically disenrolls a child from health insurance benefits, whether or not the new information renders the child ineligible. This disenrollment is remarkably inconspicuous: no computer prompts or warnings alert the caseworker. An observant caseworker who notices the disenrollment must go back into the system to restore health insurance benefits.
A common element across these proximate causes of premature disenrollment is a computerized eligibility system that is not programmed to ensure that children who qualify automatically receive 12 months of continuous coverage. Instead, caseworkers must, to some extent, actively administer the continuous coverage policy. This process, however, is made more difficult by a number of factors:
h Different programs, different rules. The various programs that local caseworkers administer have different sets of eligibility rules and review periods, 12 which are complicated and difficult to master. h Competing policy priorities. Caseworkers and administrators alike report that since Kansas' welfare reform program was implemented in 1997, the labor-intensive management of TANF work programs has been a priority. Caseworkers' performance in administering TANF (as well as food stamps) is monitored, evaluated, and tied to workplace incentives; performance in administering public health insurance benefits is monitored less closely and is not tied to workplace incentives. h Different programs, different philosophies.
Caseworkers at the local level have been asked to adopt very different philosophies and attitudes for the various programs they help administer. For TANF, caseworkers and administrators perceive that the state's philosophy is to keep the duration of assistance to a minimum. For food stamps, the federally imposed program objective is month-bymonth accuracy: all eligible people-and only eligible people-should be enrolled. For public health insurance, however, the objective is to enroll as many as are eligible and to cover them for a full year at a time. It may be difficult for caseworkers to simultaneously implement programs with such differing objectives and underlying philosophies, especially where programs require initiative on the part of the caseworker, as is sometimes true for the 12-month coverage policy for Medicaid and SCHIP.
Potential Benefits of Coordination
The results and interpretations provided so far might appear to offer little support for a local SRS office's involvement in the administration of public health insurance benefits, but there is another side to the story. One of the basic premises behind coordinating public benefits is assurance that when people enter an office for help, they get whatever help they need in one visit. For instance, they may come in for cash benefits, but walk out with health insurance benefits (Mann et al. 2002) . This kind of benefit coordination is part of the mission of the social services agency in Kansas. Despite the fact that most of the state's public health insurance outreach efforts have been organized around dissemination of a joint SCHIP/Medicaid mail-in application form, most children still are enrolled by the traditional method of applying through a local SRS office. During the two-and-a-half year period ending in June 2001, more than three-quarters of all new enrollees came in through a local office, including 38% of SCHIP enrollees and 87% of children entering Medicaid. 13 Moreover, the percentage of children enrolling as a result of walk-in applications was higher for lower-income types of enrollees: right across the board, the poorer the family, the more likely they were to have applied at a local office. If local offices were not involved at all in the administration of Medicaid and SCHIP benefits, threequarters of all new enrollments would be put at risk, including an even higher percentage of the lowest-income enrollees. 14
Policy Implications
The results of this study indicate a strong relationship between the location and setting for eligibil-ity case management and the rate at which children in public health insurance in Kansas disenroll during their first potential year of coverage. These findings suggest that rates of retention could improve with program-specific case management. Partly for this reason, in late 2001, Kansas began creating separate eligibility cases to be used solely for public health insurance; it also instituted a policy of transferring public health insurance enrollment cases for most children (and some adults) to a central clearinghouse for postenrollment case management. Nevertheless, local social services offices have played an important role in the administration of SCHIP and Medicaid in Kansas, enrolling the vast majority of children who enter public health insurance. There are obvious advantages associated with maintaining the role of the local office in outreach and enrollment, not the least of which is the spillover effect of coordinating initial enrollments across public assistance programs. The management challenge for state social service officials is to continue to enroll the kinds of children who traditionally have entered public health insurance through a local office, while mitigating the effect that local case management, with its inherent complications, can have on premature disenrollment. Transferring active enrollment cases to the clearinghouse after an application is processed is one strategy for pursuing the twin goals of maximizing enrollment and minimizing disenrollment; however, caseworkers report that this process is administratively burdensome, requiring the transfer of electronic as well as paper records between the field and the clearinghouse, and sometimes requiring personal communication between caseworkers in the two locations. Another strategy might be to raise the profile of the 12-month coverage policy among caseworkers in the field by introducing performance standards and/or rewards based on successful application of the policy, as Louisiana, Indiana, and Alaska have done. 15 However, without significant improvements to the computerized eligibility system, it is unclear whether caseworkers could administer such a wide variety of public programs with equal verve and minimal error given the extent to which the programs' populations, rules, and philosophies differ. States that design their electronic eligibility systems to automatically implement continuous coverage, and then provide incentives for caseworkers to support this policy, seem most likely to avoid a difficult trade-off between the benefits to enrollment of administering SCHIP alongside other assistance programs, and the benefits to retention of administering SCHIP separately.
There is reason to suspect that Kansas is not the only state facing difficult decisions about the appropriate role that local social services offices should play in the administration of SCHIP and Medicaid benefits. Forty-one other states have adopted an annual review cycle or some form of 12-month continuous coverage for children in public health insurance (Ross and Cox 2002) . It is possible that some states without an explicit policy of continuous coverage nonetheless may have adopted policies or practices that increase the continuity of enrollment. For example, New York and Florida do not have continuous coverage, but they also do not collect income information from families between reviews, and their mid-cycle disenrollment rates are similar to those in Oregon and Kansas where continuous coverage is an explicit policy (Dick et al. 2002) . Given that Kansas' policy objectives and disenrollment patterns are not unique, it is possible that other states may be experiencing some of the same administrative problems that limit the continuity of coverage in Kansas. Ohio experienced enrollment system problems similar to those found in Kansas during the first 10 months of its SCHIP program, while caseworkers in California have reported that complicated program rules and competing priorities hindered their efforts to maximize retention in the Medicaid program. 16 The results of this study also emphasize the potential benefits of allowing families to apply for SCHIP benefits at a local social services office: more than one-third of new SCHIP enrollees in Kansas have entered the program in this way. Some states, including New York, California, Texas, and Florida, do not enroll families into SCHIP at local social services offices. While this may simplify the administration of SCHIP benefits and may help to disassociate SCHIP from the potential stigma of other public programs in the minds of some applicants, Kansas' experience suggests that there may be a substantial number of SCHIP-eligible children whose coverage is at risk if the option to apply in person at a local welfare office is not made available to them.
Notes
This study was undertaken for the Kansas Children's Service League as part of the ''Kansas Covering Kids Project,'' which was funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS). An earlier version of this study was presented at the 2002 annual meetings of the Academy for Health Services Research and Health Policy. The author would like to thank Barbara J. LaClair, M.H.A., who prepared the administrative data and conducted preliminary analyses, and Darin Bodenhamer, who is from the Medical Policy Division of SRS and provided both information and insight. The contents of this study are solely the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the funding organizations. Irvin et al.'s (2001) analysis: California (74%), Michigan (89%), New Jersey (90%) and Missouri (98%). 7 Separate regression results confirm that without controlling for the type of application, disenrollment rates for TANF were significantly higher than for SCHIP non-premium payers, while the rate for SSI children was not significantly different. 8 It is possible that the eligibility category dummy variables do not fully capture differences between the Medicaid and SCHIP populations that could confound the results. To account for this possibility, the model depicted in Table 1 was run separately for the two populations, with appropriate changes to the included eligibility categories.
In the separate models, the odds ratio for early disenrollment for walk-in applicants was 2.6 for Medicaid enrollees and 4.6 for SCHIP enrollees. 9 Note also that excluding from the analysis SSI and foster care children, who are exempt from the continuous coverage policy, did not change the basic results significantly. 10 Sub-group analysis indicates that premature disenrollments among SCHIP enrollees in months 10 to 12 were concentrated primarily among walk-in applicants. The absence of such an effect among walk-in applicants enrolling in Medicaid is consistent with the retroactive nature of Medicaid enrollments. While SCHIP enrollments are effective only after the application process is completed, Medicaid enrollments are retroactive to (at least) the beginning of the month of application, eliminating the enrollment effects of any delays in the processing of applications. 11 This type of program interaction is more likely among Medicaid families, who might be eligible for, and participate in, all three of these other programs. Few SCHIP families are likely to participate in TANF or the food stamp program since the income ranges for these programs' eligibility do not overlap with those of SCHIP, though differences in income disregards might create some overlap for food stamps. SCHIP families are more likely to also receive child care assistance, which covers families up to 185% of the federal poverty level. 12 While other programs also may entail an annual review cycle, they typically also include monthly updates for family and income status. In addition, families may enroll in programs at different times, so that review dates may not be aligned even where review cycle lengths are the same. 13 Of the new enrollees that were determined to have applied by mail, 54% enrolled in Medicaid and 46% enrolled in SCHIP. 14 This discussion is centered on the effect of local offices on new enrollments. Some states also have taken steps to improve the renewal process for public health insurance through enhanced coordination of various assistance programs. See, for example, Ku and Ross (2002) . 15 Mann et al. (2002) report that Indiana and Alaska recently have undertaken such efforts. Ku and Ross (2002) report that Louisiana also has taken steps recently to monitor the degree to which local Medicaid offices successfully implement enrollment policies. 16 Schwalberg et al. (1999) report that Ohio administered its Medicaid, SCHIP, cash assistance and food stamps programs using the same computerized eligibility system, leading to ''unnecessary termination of benefits.'' Like Kansas, Ohio accepted SCHIP applications at county human services offices (p. 24). See also Wong and Winterbauer (2001) for a discussion of administrative complexities at local social services offices in California.
